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Liberty! Freedom! Tyranny is dead! 
Run hence, proclaim, cry it about the streets! 
 –William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 
 
ublished in 1859, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty advo-
cates individuals’ moral and economic freedom from 
the state. Nearly 150 years later, Mill’s work continues 
to be relevant in determining our personal liberties 
and the limits of the government. However, as society becomes 
increasingly international in scope, it is important to consider 
how Mill’s liberty theory applies to international affairs and the 
relations between governments.  When Mill’s principles are ex-
tended to such an application, they become more difficult to de-
fine. In this paper, I will consider what the appropriate applica-
tion of Mill’s theory is to the relationship between nations that 
do not endorse the liberty principle for their citizens1 – but do not 
interfere with other nations – and those that do endorse the lib-
erty principle for their citizens. Though Mill has written specifi-
cally on the topic of interventionism (namely, “A Few Words on 
Non-Intervention”), this paper will focus primarily on Mill’s 
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principles of liberty as outlined in On Liberty, with reference to 
his other works only to illustrate that my interpretation of On 
Liberty is in accordance with them. I will first consider an exten-
sion of the harm principle2  to intergovernmental relations, which 
would require that liberal nations respect the autonomy of non-
liberal political authorities in all cases where the non-liberal po-
litical authority does not cause harm to other nations. I will reject 
this application of Mill’s theory on a number of grounds with the 
purpose of furthering the contention that On Liberty supports 
intervention at least in some instances. I will then argue that a 
correct interpretation of Mill’s theory will support the interven-
tion of liberal governments on behalf of those citizens whose 
governments do not endorse the liberty principle, but do not in-
terfere with other nations.  
Other liberal theorists have contended that the aim of liberal 
foreign policy is “to be quiet, to be unostentatious, to pretend to 
nothing, not to thrust claims and unconstitutional claims for as-
cendancy and otherwise in the teeth of your neighbor.”3  Other 
liberal theorists, such as Joseph Strayer, Charles Tilly, and An-
thony Giddens,4  have argued that states are autonomous and 
sovereign based on their function: “the state’s ‘function’ was to 
make war and to build power vis-à-vis other states and society. 
‘Society’ was largely an adversary in this process as it resisted 
the states rulers’ power to extract resources and to monopolize 
political and judicial authority.”5  Although it is accepted that 
Mill does not subscribe to a similar view of state autonomy and 
the power of nations, I am going to put forward one interpreta-
tion of On Liberty that would agree with those liberals who favor 
state sovereignty. Though this interpretation, which I will refer 
to as the argument from analogy, is of my own creation and is 
not an exact representation of the liberal arguments cited above, 
it will be useful in illustrating the true scope and nature of Mill’s 
liberty theory as opposed to the liberal state sovereignty argu-
ments cited above.  
The argument from analogy is based on the harm principle as 
Mill establishes it in On Liberty:  
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The sole end for which mankind are warranted… in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical 
or moral, is not sufficient warrant.6  
 
Put simply, the harm principle prohibits the restraint of another 
person’s actions unless those actions will cause harm to others. 
Although in On Liberty Mill intends this principle to guide a gov-
ernment’s actions towards its citizens or a person’s actions to-
wards other people, an analogy can be drawn from the relation-
ship between persons to the relationship between nations, allow-
ing the harm principle to be extended to foreign policy.  
I will refer to the principle established when the harm princi-
ple is extended to foreign policy as the “international harm prin-
ciple.” Like the state sovereignty arguments made by the liberal 
theorists, mentioned above, the international harm principle will 
imagine governments to be separate entities, like a giant Hobbe-
sian Leviathan. The international harm principle would require 
that government A ought not to restrain the actions of govern-
ment B so long as B’s actions do not cause harm to other nations. 
For example, imagine that in a coup, France is taken over by a 
tyrannical ruler who bans all Frenchmen from eating baguettes 
because they are bad for individuals’ health. According to Mill’s 
position in On Liberty, the French law banning the eating of ba-
guettes is a violation of its citizens’ liberty, but the international 
harm principle would prohibit the United States from interfer-
ing, so long as the baguette ban does not cause it harm. If, say, 
France began dumping its uneaten baguettes into Italy, then the 
new law might cause Italy harm and the United States might be 
justified in interfering.7  A key point to observe in the harm prin-
ciple analogy is that when the harm principle is extended to for-
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eign policy, governments become giant people and any inter- 
ference with another government necessarily targets that government
and not its citizens; the purpose of any intervention is always to 
prevent harm to one’s own nation or to the community of na-
tions, and not to help the citizens whose liberty is being denied. 
Mill did not intend and would not support the analogy made 
from the harm principle to the international harm principle, and 
he would not support the consequential strict principle of non-
intervention, either. In “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” 
Mill clearly argues that there are cases in which intervention is 
necessary and should be done.8  While the above harm principle 
analogy would seem to illustrate that in On Liberty Mill contra-
dicts his argument in “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” I 
contend that Mill’s argument in On Liberty alone can show that 
Mill would not support a strict principle of non-intervention. 
While other liberal theorists have argued that, as in the interna-
tional harm principle, nations ought not to interfere with other 
nations that do not cause harm, such arguments require an em-
phasis on the sovereignty of the nation as a Leviathan-like entity 
to which Mill does not subscribe. 
Like state-centric notions of liberalism, the analogy of the in-
ternational harm principle does not take seriously Mill’s commit-
ment to the individual as the central moral figure. By extending 
the harm principle to an international harm principle such that 
intervention is not acceptable in the case of a nation that does not 
endorse the liberty principle but does not interfere with other 
nations, we ignore one of the key concepts of On Liberty. In 
Chapter 1 of On Liberty, Mill says, “The subject of this Essay is…
Civil or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which 
can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.”9  The 
question is not “when is any party justified in interfering with 
another party’s liberty?” but rather one of society versus the indi-
vidual. Furthermore, Mill spends an entire chapter10  arguing for 
the desirability of individuality and maintaining the principle 
that the free development of individuality is essential to the well-
being of society. The individual is central to Mill’s liberty theory; 
liberty, as Mill conceives it, does not make sense unless the indi-
vidual is its moral end, for liberty is the power of the individual 
within a society.  
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Considering Mill’s emphasis on the individual as the moral 
end of liberty, the analogy argument for non-intervention must 
be reevaluated. The analogy used to extend the harm principle to 
an international harm principle requires that the nation becomes 
the ‘individual’ and the international community becomes 
‘society,’ but such an analogy ignores the fact that individuals 
necessarily comprise any nation, and that Mill’s conception of 
liberty must chiefly concern those individuals. Take for example 
the case described above, where a tyrannical ruler takes over 
France and prohibits all French citizens from eating baguette. 
What is important to Mill’s liberty principle in this case is that 
the French citizens’ actions are being restrained, despite the fact 
(or at least not because of the fact) that their not eating baguettes 
would not cause any harm to society. When we use the interna-
tional harm principle to imagine nations as sovereign entities in 
this case, we, as the United States or Italy or any other nation 
considering intervention, necessarily ignore the plight of the 
French citizens who are being denied their baguette and focus 
only on how the baguette ban affects us. If the ban does not affect 
us, says the international harm principle, we are not justified in 
interfering. In “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Mill asserts, 
“of all attitudes which a nation can take upon the subject of inter-
vention, the meanest and worst is to profess that it interferes 
only when it can serve its own objects by it.”11  In On Liberty, 
Mill’s emphasis on the importance of the individual to both the 
definition of liberty and to the well-being of society illustrates 
this same concept: that a political authority ought not to inter-
vene solely for its own purposes. Because the international harm 
principle, like liberal theories of state sovereignty, would not al-
low intervention except in the case that a nation is being harmed, 
to serve its own purposes while ignoring the importance of the 
individual, such a principle cannot be an appropriate interpreta-
tion of Mill’s liberty theory. 
I will now move on to my argument that Mill’s principles in 
On Liberty would require the intervention of liberal governments 
on behalf of those citizens whose governments do not endorse 
the liberty principle, but do not interfere with other nations. As I 
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stressed in the previous two paragraphs, Mill has a strong com-
mitment to the individual as the sole moral end of liberty and 
any foreign policy that does not take this commitment seriously 
cannot be an appropriate interpretation of Mill’s liberty theory. 
The single purpose of government for Mill is to preserve the lib-
erty of its citizens, and furthermore, “the worth of a State, in the 
long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it.”12  It does 
not matter, then, whether it is government at the city, state, na-
tion or world level, so long as its laws are laws that provide the 
most possible liberty to its citizens, or, put differently, its laws do 
not interfere with the actions of its citizens who do not cause 
harm to others. In utilitarian terms, nations themselves have util-
ity only insofar as their citizens have utility, and their citizens 
have the most utility when they are free to pursue individual in-
terests and to have discussions. Such freedom is not unlimited, 
but rather government “provides security for most of our free-
dom by limiting some of it.”13  Albert William Levi goes even fur-
ther in his analysis of On Liberty to say that “Liberty in a sense 
transcends the realm of the social altogether.”14  Assuming the 
social to include the governments and the laws that define social 
life, I take this to mean that liberty is part of some greater good, 
and thus government must answer to that good above and be-
yond all else. All of this is to say that if a government does not 
endorse the liberty principle, it is not, in a sense, fulfilling its role 
as a government. A non-liberal government is like a band of rob-
bers stealing its citizen’s liberties, and because that will poten-
tially negatively affect the total utility of society, it may be neces-
sary15  to take action against them. Even if a non-liberal govern-
ment is, as Rawls would call it, a “decent hierarchal people,” and 
provides its citizens with basic human liberties and some system 
of justice, that government is still stealing from its citizens their 
freedom of individuality, and  thus liberal nations have the right 
to choose to interfere with them.16  
It may be argued that a non-liberal nation is like the Mormon 
community that Mill discusses in Chapter 4, and thus there is no 
right of interference. In Chapter 4, Mill says about the Mormon 
religion, which is voluntary, that: 
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It is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyr-
anny they can be prevented from living there [in a re-
mote corner of the earth, which they have been the first 
to render habitable to human beings] under what laws 
they please, provided they commit no aggression on 
other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure 
to those who are dissatisfied with their ways….I can-
not admit that persons entirely unconnected with them 
ought to step in and require that a condition of things 
with which all who are directly interested appear to be 
satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scan-
dal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who 
have no part or concern for it.17  
 
There are two important parts to this example; first, there are cri-
teria for the recognition of non-liberal groups, and second, there 
is the establishment of why we should not interfere with such 
groups. Beginning with the first part, Mill supports the establish-
ment of groups that do not endorse the liberty principle on two 
conditions: 1) they commit no aggression on other nations; and 2) 
they allow for the perfect freedom of departure. To use this ex-
ample to argue that Mill would not support intervention, the 
non-liberal governments would have to meet these two criteria, 
and while it is clear that, in the case we are discussing, they do 
not commit aggressions on other nations, it is not as clear that 
they allow for the perfect freedom of departure. For the person 
who is dissatisfied with the polygamy that occurs in the Mormon 
religion, it would be difficult but reasonable for that person to 
leave; they would not have to travel far, and they would have at 
least some skills (particularly the ability to speak the language) 
that would help them survive upon exit. Referring one last time 
to the tyrannical ruler who bans Frenchmen from eating ba-
guettes, I believe that it is unreasonable to say that the French 
citizens have freedom of exit. Because, for the majority of the 
population, leaving one’s country is prohibitively expensive and 
requires traveling vast distances, learning a new language and 
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learning new job skills, it is not clear that citizens are “free” to 
leave, since one cannot be free to do what one cannot do. Because 
it does not meet the second criterion of freedom of departure, 
non-liberal nations do not fall into the same category as the Mor-
mon example, and thus does not necessarily result in the same 
consequences. 
In the second part of the above statement, Mill suggests that 
those people who are unconnected with the group have no busi-
ness interfering with it simple because it is a “scandal.” As a 
counterargument to this, I will simply say that in our contempo-
rary society, being unconnected from any other nation is impos-
sible, and thus we have reason to concern ourselves with the lib-
erties of other individuals. When Mill wrote the Mormon exam-
ple, he could not possibly have imagined that society would 
reach the level of communication and interconnectedness that we 
have today. Because the Mormon example is not analogous to 
contemporary international relations, it fails as an argument 
against the right of intervention. 
 
In conclusion, Mill’s liberty theory would give the right to 
liberal nations to intervene with a nation that does not endorse 
the liberty principle even if that nation does not interfere with 
other nations. This conclusion is based on Mill’s commitment to 
the individual as both the sole moral end of liberty and as the 
basis for which government exists and is made legitimate. I have 
suggested that intervention would be a right and not an obliga-
tion, but I will not go further to detail exactly how and when Mill 
would recommend intervention, for that is far too large a topic 
for this paper. However, I will assert that, following the princi-
ples of liberty established in On Liberty, the decision of how and 
when to intervene ought to rest on the utility of doing so, with 
the assumption that whatever maximizes liberty while minimiz-














1  The non-liberal nations that I discuss in this paper do not in-
clude barbarians, for it is clear that Mill believes that barbarians 
are, like children, incapable of autonomy; “Despotism is a legiti-
mate mode of government in dealing with barbarians….Liberty, 
as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to 
the time when mankind have become capable of being improved 
by free and equal discussion” (Mill, On Liberty, 13-14). Because 
Mill applies the principle of liberty only to civilized peoples,  
barbarians are excluded from my argument and it can be as-
sumed that when I discuss non-liberal nations I mean those na-
tions that are civilized but whose governments do not endorse 
the liberty principle for its citizens. 
2  As defined in Feinberg, Social Philosophy, 25. 
3  Miller, “John Stuart Mill’s Theory of International Relations,” 
494. 
4   See Ercegovac, “Competing National Ideologies, Cyclical Re-
sponses,” Chapter Four. 
5   Thomson, “State Sovreignty in International Relations: Bridg-
ing the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” 216. 
6  Mill, On Liberty, 13. 
7  That is not to say that Italy ought to go to war against France, 
for it depends on utility: “As soon as any part of a person’s con-
duct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has juris-
diction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will 
or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to 
discussion” (Mill, On Liberty, 76). The example is intended only 
to draw a distinction between acts that harm others and those 
that are self-regarding, within the scope of international rela-
tions. 
8  In “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Mill is careful to ex-
plain that intervention is dangerous and generally unjustifiable, 
but he clearly argues that there exist cases in which intervention 
is necessary and should be done. In cases of self-defense: “We 
must except [from the general principle that it is not right to    
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interfere with another nation], of course, any case in which such 
assistance is a measure of legitimate self-defense” (260). In cases 
of a tyranny aided by foreign arms: “Intervention to enforce non-
intervention is always rightful, always moral, if not always pru-
dent” (261). 
9  Mill, On Liberty, 5 (emphasis added). 
10  Chapter Three: “Of individuality, as one of the elements of 
well-being.” 
11  Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” 243. 
12  Mill, On Liberty, 115. 
13  Gaus, Political Concepts and Political Theories, 116. 
14  Levi, “The Value of Freedom: Mill’s Liberty (1859 – 1959),” 15. 
15  I want to stress that no nation or group is ever obligated to take 
action against another nation or group that does not support the 
liberty principle so long as there is no act of aggression and the 
members do not ask for help, and even then it is unclear if there 
would be any obligation to intervene. I only contend that there 
would be a right to intervene. 
16  Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 62. 
17  Mill, On Liberty, 92.  
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